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Unfootnoted Musings from the Margins 
By Leon Botstein 
It has become fashionable among scholars to wax autobiographical with 
the reader, presumably to shed any remnant of the illusion (suggested 
implicitly by the conventional apparatus of a scholarly text and footnotes) 
that one might be speaking with an objective voice, or with an argument 
whose merits can be considered and even accepted without reference to 
personal and therefore circumstantial prejudice. Today's penchant for 
presumed full disclosure of one's subjective standpoint, however, is more 
likely either a species of authorial vanity masquerading as methodological 
scrupulousness or evidence of a greater interest in oneself than the sub-
ject one is writing about. In this case, the reader who wishes to distill the 
prejudices of the author and speculate on their origins must begin with 
the author's notion that one can talk effectively about the character and 
value of arguments by using procedures of reading and research that hold 
up under scrutiny and require no subjective apologetics. 
We are witnesses to a distortion of the fin-de-siecle's singular contribu-
tion to the methodology of the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften)-a 
common term in German scholarship that encompasses what in the United 
States is called the humanities and the social sciences. Wilhelm Dilthey 
and Max Weber, for example, each illuminated in his own way how the 
perspective of the investigator in the Geisteswissenschaften functions in a 
crucial manner. In the Methodenstreit from the early twentieth century in-
volving such distinguished figures as Wilhelm Windelband and Ernst 
Troeltsch, the task was to define the logic of human sciences, much as 
John Stuart Mill had sought to do, without sacrificing all claims to truth-
telling contained within the acts of scholarship and argument. 
For these thinkers it seemed evident that the human sciences were in 
some decisive sense subjective in a way that the natural sciences were not. 
The framing of the problem, the choice of evidence, and the mode of 
argument-the fundamental tasks facing the scholar in the human sci-
ences-were influenced by the person doing the work in a manner far 
more profound and potentially arbitrary than was the case in the natural 
sciences. Yet it appeared possible to argue for criteria of validity in expla-
nation and description that could lend scholarship in the human sciences 
an authority then considered characteristic of, if not self-evident in, scien-
tific research. Indeed, the generation of Dilthey and Weber still clung to 
the notion that evidence and logic in the human sciences could be devel-
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oped and applied, rescuing a useful cross-cultural understanding grounded 
in a universal sense of objectivity. The delineation of a "value-free" dimen-
sion within scholarship, even with respect to the choice of subject, was 
acknowledged, no matter how complex the achievement of that appropri-
ate scholarly self-discipline might be. One could still speak reasonably, 
therefore, about whether something was true, plain false, or merely plau-
sible, particularly in terms of the writing of history. Shared ideas regarding 
the mode of generalization, the nature of causal or descriptive adequacy, 
and the grounds for reliability in explanation all might be articulated. 
This confidence in the possibility of widely accepted methods and lan-
guage in scholarship has eroded considerably since 1945. Although the 
utilization of novel methods of analysis (almost exclusively drawn from 
post-war French thinkers) in literature and in the study of society has been 
significant among scholars in the United States since 1945, the new meth-
ods have maintained their allure and drawn considerable impetus in part 
from a profound methodological suspicion and skepticism inherent in the 
approaches themselves. 
It should come as no surprise that in the relatively young disciplines of 
musicology and music history (historically speaking the products of Ger-
man scholarly traditions from the mid- and late nineteenth century) this 
skepticism and suspicion have taken a harsh toll. Perhaps in part owing to 
its relative youth, the study of music has not contributed in an autono-
mous fashion to the shared methods of the human sciences. Unlike art 
history, in which the interpretation of visual images, forms, and tech-
niques (e.g. iconography) lends itself easily to verbal translation and there-
fore generalized use, the integration of methods specific to music, even 
so-called style analysis, into the methods of history and sociology, for ex-
ample, has proved singularly elusive. When issues beyond the artificial 
confines of the musical text come into play, scholars of music have re-
sorted to borrowing methods from others. Given the current method-
ological crisis, stylized virtuosity, fashion, and quirkiness-perhaps even 
plain entertainment value-have become marks of recent scholarly suc-
cess in music. It is as if scholarship has become its own kind of perfor-
mance art, an act of improvisation on a subject whose definition as recog-
nizable and whose transformation into the unrecognizable are marks of 
genius otherwise the province of great entertainers. 
The reigning assumption behind today's scholarly consensus argues 
that the construct of perspective-how the scholar defines his or her place 
in his or her own time-creates the subject and legitimates the resultant 
analysis. The arrogance hidden in this contemporary procedure is the 
claim that the investigator-scholar can know his or her own subjectivity in 
any useful way. The typical categories of subjectivity, including gender, 
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class, nationality, and race, become all too easily employed (as opposed to 
being used in a seriously illuminating manner) as explanatory and causal 
rubrics. They are used in a reductive manner, as simplistic kinds of essen-
tialist signs that manage only to trivialize otherwise potent concepts. To 
make matters worse, a brittle and harshly moralistic politics lurks on all 
sides of today's scholarly community in the human sciences. Scholarly 
decisions and activities, stripped of the veneer of professionalism or objec-
tivity, are translated almost mechanically into fixed and reductive ideologi-
cal positions within contemporary politics. In such an environment it is 
difficult to talk well, critically, and searchingly; inquiry, curiosity, and love 
of subject all seem at risk. 
The Delphic admonition to "know thyself' is a daunting, elusive, charge. 
It sees the conduct of everyday life, including, of course, scholarship, as a 
dynamic part of one's coming to terms with oneself. "Unpacking" one's 
own views and prejudices (to use a wicked but fashionable phrase perhaps 
more applicable to the post office than to research) is the hardest of all 
enterprises. Yet substituting "from an x perspective" and utilizing reduc-
tive assessments of subjectivity with respect to context or method do not 
fulfill the demand for serious self-examination. Indeed, self-declaration or 
the overt assertion of allegiance to a particular point of view or method-
ological procedure may camouflage and mislead more than reveal and 
illuminate. 
The irony is that the skeptic-the critic of inherited procedures-rarely 
applies the same degree of harsh analysis to the grounds behind the 
skeptical attack itself. How does the skeptic know he or she is right? Either 
there is a new hidden or overtly "objective" yardstick in use (that is, the 
skeptic is telling us something we ought to know that would end the 
skepticism by introducing a surrogate ideology), or the skeptical critique 
carries no serious weight and is as much an expression of mere taste as the 
object of the critique. 
It may be that the old-fashioned criterion of scholarly distance and the 
illusion of critical neutrality, linked to a notion of getting things historical 
right in a way that transcends opinion, were useful conceits. If nothing 
else, they might remain helpful routes to coming to terms with the subjec-
tive. Far less attractive is an embrace of what some literary scholars have 
apparently now termed "standpoint epistemology." It is preferable to resist 
facile theories that not only attempt to justifY the equivalence of anything 
that is said but also eliminate the need to characterize and understand the 
construct of one's own standpoint. If one concedes that a standpoint is a 
useful category, is it functionally static and describable in some ideal or 
typical manner? To assert that all scholarship is ultimately ideological is to 
assert nothing at all, for it begs the question of what constitutes ideology 
and its definition, its dynamics, and its functions. 
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* * * 
The above prologue (or perhaps peroration), with its decidedly old-
fashioned tone, is a plea for music historians and musicology to seize the 
opportunity inherent in today's fiery methodological turmoil as a means 
to resist imitating some of the practices of its sibling disciplines in the 
humanities and social sciences. The rush away from old habits indeed may 
be justified, but the embrace of new fashions from other disciplines may 
not be, and at the very least requires scrutiny. Today's methodological 
disarray of doubt should signal to students of music that our colleagues 
possess few answers. Imitation no longer will work. In fact, the history of 
the discipline of music in the university could turn out to follow the story 
of Cinderella. Having served in the shadow of our siblings, and been filled 
with envy and admiration for them, we discover that our time has come: 
the shoe (so to speak) of the times may fit only our particular subject. For 
the first time the study of music might lead the way in the human sciences. 
The other disciplines might learn from us, defer to us, and imitate us, for 
a change. 
Though the study of music now has a chance to contribute to the way 
culture and society might be understood and studied, it is clear that we 
are still courting the danger to which the first generations of musicologists 
fell prey a century ago: the imitative appropriation of methodological 
conceits from other disciplines. For all their virtues, Guido Adler and 
Hermann Kretzschmar, for example, were not methodologically innova-
tive. And, ironically, Theodor W. Adorno's writing on music, despite its 
impressive jargon, ranks among the least self-critical and methodologically 
powerful aspects of his work. The embrace of Adorno here and in Ger-
many in the 1960s and 1970s was a symptom of the poverty of a differenti-
ated and subtle sociology of knowledge with respect to music and its role 
in culture. Thus, despite the insights about music that have come from 
anthropology, history, and literary studies, that impoverishment remains 
unalleviated. 
In more recent decades, musicology has continued to yield the lead to 
its sister disciplines in the adoption of the latest intellectual fashions. 
Musicologists are now acting the way scholars in literary studies, history, 
and anthropology acted two decades ago, and what looks new to us is 
already under siege elsewhere. Those who write about music as historians, 
instead of continuing to defer methodologically to the older disciplines 
for an adequate theory, might find greater reward in fashioning not only 
their own theory, but a general theory from within musical culture itself. 
The time has come to make a jump in front of the other disciplines, 
whose modes of operating, despite their greater degree' of historical and 
institutional advancement, are in shambles. As the Viennese satirist 
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Friedrich Kiirnberger put it more than a century ago, in order to become 
literate one must first learn to read music. 
One way that musicology might achieve this new status is through em-
bracing one of Max Weber's most compelling ideas: that any agenda or 
scholarship laying claim to significance must be tied to and therefore 
derived from some profound commitment to a contemporary predica-
ment. The affective intensity of scholarly pursuits that drives curiosity must 
be strong and rooted in the present. It comes as no surprise, then, that 
the contemporary interest in the status of women and the significance of 
gender has opened many of the most powerful new avenues of inquiry. 
Antiquarianism, no matter how brilliant, is rarely just fanatical profession-
alism rooted in a biographically explicable fastidiousness. It, too, is a reso-
lution of an individual's engagement with his or her own time. 
Some of the most serious of these predicaments facing culture and 
society today are located within the realm of music. In the musical world 
in European and American contexts they pertain to the divergent evolu-
tions of popular and concert music and the role music plays in new media 
and the formation of norms, particularly within modes of sound reproduc-
tion and within visual formats such as film and video. The relationships 
among sound, sight, and speech-and therefore the significances attached 
to them-may be changing dramatically. Furthermore, within and without 
the university, the canonic center with which traditional musical studies 
have been occupied is under siege. The distinctions between musicology 
and ethnomusicology are eroding as the aesthetic and socio-cultural prior-
ity of one kind of music against another is challenged. It is likely that in 
both practical training and theoretical or historical analysis, the category 
of music in the university and among so-called consumers (those who 
consciously partake of musical culture at a given time and place) will be 
far more catholic, encompassing a range of times, places, and categories 
well outside the ones reflected in the current distribution of resources 
within the university. Even in comparison to the study of literature or art, 
the shock of change in the content of what is studied under the heading 
of music within the university is going to be striking. 
We should neither lament these circumstances-themselves the result 
of a political evolution in Europe and the Americas-nor exploit them. 
Rather, we might profit by using the intellectual opportunity offered by 
the cultural politics of the moment. This opportunity has two critical com-
ponents. First, we could now consider music as a generic category of 
existence-a form of life, as Wittgenstein suggested, much like the way we 
might view language or fundamental economic or social habits and activi-
ties. This opens up the possibility that music might be treated as a species 
of fundamental social action. It is not a subsidiary anthropological ritual. 
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Music is instead more akin to a poorly understood nexus of communica-
tion (perhaps reaching beyond the sphere of language) in the sense sug-
gested by the work ofJiirgen Habermas. Following the footsteps of Weber, 
Adorno, and Karl Mannheim, Habermas (along with others in his genera-
tion in Germany and France) has sought to carve out the process of 
transaction and exchange through language among human beings as a 
category of social action. Habermas's ambition was to make it susceptible 
to structural and historical analysis as well as to a normative critique with 
regard to ethics and politics. 
The second compelling circumstance that ought to drive the study of 
music is the continuing decline in traditional musical literacy and culture. 
We participate, through scholarship, in the effort to preserve, if not res-
cue, the significance of the canon as it is now understood, as well as the 
repertoire to which the discipline of music has been until recently commit-
ted. However much one wishes to embrace new, esoteric developments, 
the academic study of music cannot remain oblivious to the decline in 
audiences and the erosion of appreciation for the canon and tradition. 
One way to carve out a stable place for Western concert music in a 
successful manner within the university and in the outside world of enter-
tainment (whether in truly popular ways or more museumlike formats) 
may be to reconsider how we understand music-making and its signifi-
cance from the Middle Ages to the present. If we interpret and study 
music in ways that effectively recast the general historical and cultural 
analysis of the past, the interest in the performance of music from the past 
might increase. In order to attract audiences without substantial musical 
literacy, a so-called extramusical dimension has begun to play a larger 
role, as, for example, in the program notes to concerts, or in concert 
formats that decorate musical performances by asserting linkages to his-
tory and art. But here again, one is confronted with mere parallelism and 
surface comparisons. Music and its function and culture are still not con-
sidered indispensable primary sources of historical generalizations of in-
terest to the wider public. 
Indeed, even the most au courant general analyses and specific interpre-
tations of Western culture and society have been distilled with music con-
sidered as, at best, a peripheral or illustrative phenomenon. Perhaps if we 
start with music, a range of new insights beyond the realm of music might 
emerge. The call for "interdisciplinary study" in the case of music, there-
fore, should not be considered another species of tendentiousness. Rather, 
it is a call to reject the implicit parochial separation and segmentation that 
set music apart, with its own interior history and significance, from life 
and therefore history in general. 
Take, for example, the continuing interest in Schubert. Are we using 
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research into his private life, career, and development as a composer as 
starting points to reconsider the notions of Biedermeier Vienna, romanti-
cism, or social change, or are we still trying to adapt analytical frameworks 
from other disciplines, thereby reducing the musical phenomena to illus-
trative roles? The question is not simply a matter of integrating the im-
mense volume of research about social history, economic history, and 
literary and theatrical activity into the consideration of music. Rather, we 
might use music to recast the way these other facets are understood and 
thereby accomplish the creation of a different historical context in a way 
that ultimately can shed more light on both music and its historical and 
social framework. 
In taking on this grander task, which is to use music to guide the wider 
cultural and historical analysis, much more than biography, textual analy-
sis, and reception history would be required. Music history and musicology 
can be directed at the task of trying to extract from musical culture and 
activity in human society something that defines and reveals the human 
condition in a fundamental manner, as opposed to merely in a manner that 
adds to or fills out our grasp of the past and present. What we as scholars 
should seek is that which otherwise would be inaccessible without music. 
This goal is not contingent on a simple philosophical notion that mu-
sic, in some neo-Hanslick-like or neo-Schopenhauerian sense, is autono-
mous, deeper, and structurally distant (and therefore implicitly irrelevant) 
from other activities. Rather, it holds that within any given context, how-
ever defined, the complex dynamics around musical activity-including 
the way music is thought about and responded to-can yield insights that 
recast what we can learn from ordinary language, visual creations, reli-
gious rituals, and so on. 
Consider a case in the history of philosophy. Increasingly, writers on 
music have sought to utilize Wittgenstein's insights about music as a way of 
understanding how music functions. This is happening much the way it 
occurred with Adorno's work. From the Tractatus on, Wittgenstein used 
music as example, analogy, and metaphor; he emplloyed what he later 
termed the family resemblance between language and music as a way of 
probing the nature of language. Yet what Wittgenstein had in mind when 
he talked of music is hardly clear. Furthermore, how did he hear it? Why, 
for example, was he profoundly conservative and hostile to modernism? 
Why was Brahms for him the last of the greats? What function did music 
play (and in what manner) in anthropological terms, in the day-to-day 
course of his childhood and adult life? It is difficult to assemble a coher-
ent, comprehensive picture of his view of music from the texts alone, for 
the bits and pieces of his explicit claims, including commentary on com-
posers and on music, are strewn throughout his writings. 
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What might be suggested is that getting to the heart of what Wittgenstein 
meant when he spoke about music constitutes a complex and comprehen-
sive quasi-anthropological and socio-historical task with music at its center. 
Understanding how Wittgenstein thought about music could yield clues 
about the core of his thoughts otherwise unexplored by philosophers and 
historians, who have generally paid scant attention to the issue of music in 
Wittgenstein. Instead of using language as a metaphor for how music 
works, then, we could reverse the inquiry and study music as a route to 
clarifying the nature and function of language not only in Wittgenstein's 
thought but in history in general. Such a procedure might yield powerful 
results for socio-linguistics, social history, and psychology. 
Likewise, apart from using the suggestive insights Adorno had about 
particular works and composers, unraveling his fierce rhetoric about mu-
sic in relation to the musical culture and world he inhabited tells us 
unique things about him and his colleagues in the Frankfurt School dur-
ing the 1920s and 1930s. This might lead to new perspectives on the way 
social dynamics were constructed by Adorno and his colleagues, which in 
turn might trigger a revisionist view of the way historians and critics deal 
with the traditions of critical theory. The task in these cases remains in the 
widest sense a historical one. 
This approach, however, does not involve the transfer of insights about 
an extramusical "context" into the discourse of music; it cannot be an 
enterprise of the appropriation of cliches and generalizations. Rather, the 
development of a subtly textured, comprehensive analysis of musical cul-
ture and activity (including musical texts and the modes of their consump-
tion, along with their acoustic realization)-within any given cultural and 
historical moment-helps to shape and define the meaning of context 
right at the outset. Using music as a primary source can test and perhaps 
profoundly revise our sense of the past. And if this is true, why relegate 
music, in relationship to the linguistic or the visual, to a peripheral status? 
Why explain mental habits in the past primarily through other modes of 
thought? Why not instead assume the centrality of music? 
Such a path has not been taken because our sense of the past-whether 
within the European framework or elsewhere-invariably has been con-
structed without reference to music. Take, for example, the Central Euro-
pean fin de siecle. For all that has been written about the art, architecture, 
literature, philosophy, and politics of the time (except for some passing 
efforts to integrate benign and glib references to Gustav Mahler and Arnold 
Schoenberg that quote usually from the latter's prose writings), works of 
music and the musical world are cited and discussed with considerable 
ease, at best to confirm and complement a prior general picture and 
interpretation. The texts of music (without any subtle or complex analy-
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sis), musical life, or the character and function of hearing, performance, 
and other modes of reception (e.g. reading about music or reading mu-
sic) are all described in terms borrowed from literary or visual analyses. 
Within the field of music, the works of music are still cast by theorists and 
scholars of musical texts generally within a framework, however modified, 
of an autonomous historical logic specific to music itself. It is as if the 
artisan-craftsmanship tradition (in terms of who musicians are and how 
they work) and the nineteenth-century ideology of music's independent 
formal essence still hold a sort of collaborative sway. 
Equally unexplored is the character of daily music life, from the home, 
to the street, to the concert hall. Within the nineteenth century, for ex-
ample, even a look at composers of secondary rank-not in a search of 
neglected aesthetic values but for historical insights-has not begun. Re-
search on music education, musical institutions, music in the private and 
public arenas, and the interrelationship of the many forms and rituals of 
music-making to one another and to other aspects of culture and society, 
particularly within the fin de siecle, still has not taken hold. 
The ultimate goal is to gain an understanding of musical culture that 
accounts for issues of place, gender, and class and that probes the dynam-
ics of significance with respect to music, but which does not operate on 
the basis of a restrictive definition of music or its role in society and 
culture. This, in turn, necessitates the development of methods of analy-
sis-whether of the acoustical environment, the use of time, or the ways 
music was encountered and talked about-that require skills uniquely 
held by the musicological and music-historical profession. No other branch 
of the human sciences, not even those that deal with experiences of the 
visual and the spatial, such as art, architecture, and design, has unique 
access to so vital and unexplored an area of human experience, whose 
decoding requires special skills apart from a command of ordinary lan-
guage. If one accepts the idea that musical culture is not subordinate, 
then the study of music gains a significance accorded only the archaeo-
logical discovery that changes the understanding of lost civilizations. 
The reason discussions of the fin de siecle are impoverished by the 
virtual absence of the contribution that music might make (even a Schenker-
Wittgenstein comparison, an obvious, albeit limited, subject, has yet to be 
undertaken) is that by training and predilection most professionals out-
side of music cannot deal with music. Not only do they lack the skills to 
talk about a musical text, they are unable to ask and answer questions 
even about the significance of how music was understood through speech. 
To answer, for example, questions about reception and, in the cases of 
Wittgenstein, Freud, Schnitzler, the role of music, their connection to a 
musical culture and their apparent absence of engagement need to be 
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outlined and described. The crucial cultural exchange with music can 
illuminate a wide range of issues well beyond the confines of music. Freud's 
relationship to music-indeed, the minor place it seemed to occupy-
constitutes as powerful a choice as his overt interest in antiquity. The two, 
in fact, may be related. Within Freud's framework resistance, like silence, 
needs to be understood. Otto Weininger's suicide in 1903 in Beethoven's 
last residence in Vienna represents merely the surface of this unexcavated 
historical territory in the Viennese fin de siecle. But beginning this work 
requires the skills of musicologists and music historians. 
A suggestive analogy to the task faced by musicology and music history 
can be made by reference to the history of science and technology. One 
might have thought that art history would provide the greatest resem-
blance. (It is indeed striking how little attention is paid to music in the 
training of art historians, and to art among musicologists.) Although schol-
ars outside of science have looked to Thomas Kuhn and the dynamics of 
shifts in paradigms within science as a helpful model for the process of 
historical change (e.g. style shifts in music), the vital link lies elsewhere. 
The history of science has revealed dimensions of what, for lack of a better 
term, can be described as mental structures. The theory of explanation, 
patterns of observation, and the dissemination of ideas-the dialectical 
tension between theory and practice-in science, as in music, provide 
further useful hints as to how the history of music, like the history of 
science, can be placed at the center of the historical narrative. The conse-
quences of science-in technology, for example, in the intersection be-
tween the various types of science and their institutionalization and eco-
nomic and social activity-all have suggestive parallels in the world of 
music. For the history of science to make its contribution to our grasp of 
culture and society, scholars with the capacity to deal with the scientific, 
mathematical, and technical material are crucial. The same would be true 
for music. 
Two more arenas offer hints as to what music historians and musicolo-
gists might accomplish. Both economic and social history and the history 
of theater (as another arena with shared issues of text and performance 
practice) possess issues and approaches that merit attention, not necessar-
ily imitation. All this points to the need to train future scholars of music in 
new ways and to encourage them to ask the sorts of sweeping questions of 
historical interpretation, description, and analysis that music historians 
traditionally have ceded to their peers from other disciplines. 
* * * 
No matter how new much of today's work in musicology and music 
history seems, it appears still to concede a fundamental marginality to 
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musical phenomena. Music has yet to produce-from within itself, so to 
speak-the kind of contribution to our understanding of the past, in 
terms of culture and society, achieved by the great historians and inter-
preters of religion, science, art, and literature. 
If this claim is correct, then the questions raised by scholars in music 
demand reconsideration. Even though the core of training should be the 
capacity to use the materials of music passively and practically, the context 
in which those skills are placed must change. For example, the vestiges of 
a snobbishness against performance must be set aside simply because the 
scholarly study of music per se is a study of performance in time and 
space. As is the case for all scholars in the human sciences, it is impossible 
not to carry forward our instincts about the nature of reading and how we 
read when we interpret texts, and it is also imperative to attempt critically 
to understand reading as a differentiated social-historical phenomenon 
(its link to speech, writing, religious ritual, daily discourse, use of memory, 
and so forth). For these reasons, a scholar of music must also have the 
contemporary experience of performance-contact with acoustic sound 
made by oneself and an audience, private or public-in order to be 
equipped to guard against the assumption of facile comparisons or conti-
nuities. The use of performance experience is indirect but essential. 
Beyond these active musical skins, the scholar of music would benefit 
from more thorough training in the general research methods of history. 
Training in the task of interpretation in non-musical issues and materials 
within each particular segment of time is needed if music is to be used as a 
fundamental constituent of the historical narrative. The musical scholar, 
therefore, requires a much more extensive education in art history, in 
social, cultural, and economic history, in anthropology, and in the philo-
sophical critique of methods than heretofore considered. 
The definition of future methods of analysis, including the setting of 
the research agenda, cannot be undertaken from within the current tradi-
tions of music history or musicology. If one laments the fact that one is 
asking for more and not less, then so be it. Otherwise, the study of music 
will remain of interest primarily to those who accept and embrace a philo-
sophical prejudice about music and therefore a familiar social and histori-
cal segmentation of the musical from the extramusical. Music will remain 
merely illustrative of historical claims, still rooted in a secondary and sub-
sidiary place. This would be a shame, since the opportunity-in part as a 
result of the methodological travails and exhaustion in other fields of the 
human sciences-presents itself for us to use the study of music as a 
primary vehicle for the reinterpretation of culture and society. 
